Experimental philosophy, experimental economics

Interesting article at Prospect Magazine called Philosophy’s Great Experiment, about the rise of ‘experimental philosophy’. Doubly interesting to me, because it could equally well be talking about experimental economics, albeit a few years too late. Or about “neuroeconomics“; the philosophers in the article are using fMRI machines to look for patterns of neuronal activity when subjects are presented with philosophical problems”, just like the researcher who does the same for resource allocation – economics – problems. But here’s the rub:

Some philosophers quietly dismiss the movement as a cynical step by researchers to appear cutting edge and to tap into scientists’ funding.

Indeed, it’s easy to feel this way about the kind of experiments in which economists step on psychologists’ toes. The drive toward empiricism in philosophy that the article talks about seems to be symptomatic of social sciences’ and humanities’ desire to be taken “seriously” as science.
And as we know, that means we need something falsifiable or verifiable. “There is no article in Prospect Magazine called Philosophy’s Great Experiment” is falsifiable, because I can find such an article and falsify the statement. “There is at least one article in Prospect Magazine called Philosophy’s Great Experiment” is verifiable, because I can find such an article and verify the statement. 
In experimental economics, often it seems (at least to this observer) that we’re replicating, or at least mirroring, psychology experiments. Unfortunately, the economics experiment is much less likely to be “scientific”, not because of the method or the issue at hand, but because of the specific question. This is precisely what Lawrence Boland discusses in the paper “On the futility of criticizing the neoclassical maximization hypothesis” (pdf), which I read as a welcome withering put-down to all of those who claim to “disprove rationality“, etc etc. He says:
Properly stated, the neoclassical premise is: ‘For all decision makers there is something they maximize’… The person who assumed the premise is true can respond: ‘You claim you have found a consumer who is not a maximizer but how do you know there is not something which he is maximizing?’

For experimental economists and experimental philosophers alike, the challenge is to pose a scientific question; without that, no method will save us. “Are people ethical?”, for example, is equally a dead end as “are people rational?”. 

More ultimatum game ignorance

I wonder what it is about the ultimatum game that makes for journalistic error? More of the same from Emily Yoffe in Slate:
We like to think we go through life as rational beings. Much of economic theory is based on the notion that humans make rational choices (which may mean that economists don’t get out much). 
“Rationality” is a model, and admits any form of behavior. It does not say how someone “should” behave.
In 1982, some economists came up with a little game to study negotiating strategies. The results showed that rationality is subservient to more powerful drives—and demonstrated why human beings so easily conclude they are being wronged. The idea of the “ultimatum game” is simple. Player A is given 20 $1 bills and told that, in order to keep any of the money, A must share it with Player B. If B accepts A’s offer, they both pocket whatever they’ve agreed to. If B rejects the offer, they both get nothing. Economists naturally expected the players to do the rational thing: A would offer the lowest possible amount—$1; and B, knowing $1 was more than zero, would accept. Ha!
This is the Nash Equilibrium of the game, if both players cared only about money. It has nothing to do with “rationality”. 
In the years the game has been played, it’s been found that almost half the A’s immediately offer to split the money—an offer B’s accept. When A offers $9 or even $8, B usually says yes. But when A’s offer drops to $7, about half the B’s walk away. The lower A’s offer, the more likely the B’s are to turn their backs on a few free dollars in favor of a more satisfying outcome: punishing the person who offended their sense of fairness. This impulse is not illogical; it is essential. 
Only the hypothetical economists in the article found it illogical, and they’re not real. Once more: rejection of a lowball offer in the ultimatum game is rational under the entirely realistic assumption that people care about more than money. Please stop attacking the straw economist who disagrees with that statement.